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We revisit the role of the manager as implied by the capital asset
pricing model (CAPM) and address the three-decade discourse that
has emerged in the Academy of Management Review concerning
the responsibility of the manager. This discourse has embraced the
conclusion that because CAPM only prices systematic risk and
does not price unsystematic (firm-specific) risk, managers’ deci-
sions and actions are not priced by CAPM. The management liter-
ature implies that because managers’ actions are not priced by
CAPM, finance theory considers managers’ actions irrelevant. We
demonstrate analytically that CAPM, and specifically systematic
risk, does consider and price the role of the manager.
Introduction
In their comprehensive piece Chatterjee, Lubatkin, and Schulze (1999)
suggest that the capital asset pricing model (CAPM) poses a strong challenge
to the field of strategy. They remind us that the main reason that CAPM poses
this challenge, as first noted by Bettis (1983), is that management theory is
based on the premise that management matters. Thus, as per management the-
ory, managers ought to be able to protect and navigate their firms in ways that
are valuable to investors. Chatterjee, Lubatkin, and Schulze (1999) claim the
CAPM implores managers to focus on lowering their firm’s systematic risk,
and not be concerned with unsystematic or firm-specific risk. Specifically they
identify two dilemmas between the CAPM’s implications and strategic man-
agement theory:
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First, reducing beta requires that managers do something which they
cannot - that is, reduce investors’ exposure to macroeconomic uncertainties at
a lower cost than what investors could transact on their own by modifying their
investment portfolio; second, asking managers to downplay the importance of
firm specific risk is not only contrary to our field, it also tempts corporate
bankruptcy (Bettis, 1983). Thus, CAPM is clearly at odds with strategic theo-
ry since it implies that managers should focus on that which they cannot influ-
ence, and should not be concerned with that which they can and, per strategic
theory, should influence (Chatterjee, Lubatkin, and Schulze, 1999: 556).
A major reason for their conclusions regarding CAPM, and its asyn-
chronous position with strategic theory, is based on the premise that the CAPM
divides the total risk of a security’s returns into two components; unsystemat-
ic (a.k.a. as firm specific risk) and systematic (a.k.a. market risk). In its theo-
retical state, CAPM defines an equilibrium model to determine the price of
securities.  In utilizing a single market portfolio, CAPM prices the exposure
that an individual asset’s returns have relative to the returns on that market
portfolio. Thus, if total risk comprised the complete variation of a firm’s
returns, the systematic component would be represented by the portion of the
firm’s returns that co-vary with the market portfolio. Consequently the unsys-
tematic risk (i.e. firm-specific) component results from the proportion of total
risk that is unique to the firm.  At the root of the argument presented by
Chatterjee, Lubatkin, and Schulze (1999) is the apparent conflicting message
that CAPM delivers. As stated in Bettis, “Conundrum #1: Modern financial
theory suggests that the equity markets will not reward unsystematic (i.e., firm
specific) risk management, but unsystematic risk management lies at the heart
of strategic management” (1983: 406).
To summarize, Chatterjee, Lubatkin, and Schulze (1999) provide a dis-
cussion highlighting the lack of theoretical and empirical validity of CAPM,
and advance a framework that encompasses tactical, strategic, and normative
risk factors. In their discussion they offer two salient points. First, they claim
CAPM implies that the actions of a firm’s managers are irrelevant because
they are not priced. Specifically, they explain that managerial actions can only
alter firm-specific risk, and thus - because they can be diversified away by
investors through portfolio formation - investors are not rewarded for securi-
ties’ firm-specific risk. Second, Chatterjee, Lubatkin, and Schulze (1999) offer
that the risk premium on equity should not be captured by systematic risk
(beta) alone, but instead should be reflected in tactical, strategic, and norma-
tive risk factors. 
Our purpose herein is not to refute and rebut the authors’ arguments, but
more importantly to reestablish a bridge between finance and management the-
ory. Herein we demonstrate analytically that the CAPM does consider and
price the role of the manager. This truth is not inconsistent with Chatterjee,
Lubatkin, and Schulze’s (1999) proposal that there are tactical, strategic, and
normative risk factors that need to be priced. Pursuant to their theoretical devel-
opments, we will show that these risk factors are indeed priced by the CAPM.  
Revisiting Challenges to the CAPM
Since the early 1970s, there has been much debate within finance litera-
ture specifically concerning whether beta is an appropriate measure of risk.
Many researchers have found support for CAPM, and have found that there is
a linear relationship between average return and beta (Black, 1972; Black,
Jensen, and Scholes, 1972; Fama and MacBeth, 1972). However, others have
questioned whether CAPM exhibits predictive ability, or whether it is appro-
priate for determining the risk of a firm’s cash flows (Fama and French, 1992;
Grinold, 1993; Roll, 1977). For a comprehensive review of CAPM debate see
Jagannathan and McGrattan (1995). 
The debate about CAPM dates back to Roll (1977). Roll’s main argument
was that CAPM is untestable - mainly because a fully diversified portfolio is
difficult to construct. Furthermore, he pointed out that it is unclear whether the
results obtained from CAPM are due to the model being incorrect, or due to the
imperfection of the market portfolio used in the model. More specifically, to
Roll stated that any study that uses CAPM will suffer from one of two prob-
lems; (1) either the CAPM model is correct and the beta derived from the proxy
for the market (often the S&P 500) is incorrect, or (2) the CAPM model is
incorrect and the beta derived from the proxy for the market is incorrect. In
either case, using CAPM can lead to incorrect inferences. The problem with the
estimate of beta is that we are uncertain about the proxy for the market portfo-
lio. Consequently, a main implication of Roll’s (1977) critique was that
although CAPM may indeed be correct, there is no way of knowing this
because we cannot identify an efficient market portfolio. 
In what appeared to be the most damaging critique for CAPM, Fama and
French (1992) claimed that firm size and book-to-market ratios are better than
beta in explaining cross-sectional variations in stock returns. Although not
included in the literature review presented by Chatterjee, Lubatkin, and Schulze
(1999), there has since been much criticism of Fama and French’s (1992) study.
The most notable of these has been by Black (1993), who accuses them of data
mining in order to obtain desired results, especially in light of the fact that there
is no theoretical basis for the inclusion of the factors they included.
Furthermore, Black (1993) points out that Fama and French (1992) report sim-
ilar results on a largely overlapping data sample and find no size effect at all,
whether controlling for beta or not, yet they claim that size is one of the vari-
ables that “captures” the cross-sectional variation in average stock returns.
Black (1993) also claims that Fama and French (1992) give no reasons for a
relationship between size and expected return, criticizes their finding that the
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book-to-market value of firms’ equity helps capture variation in average stock
returns, and claims that because markets are somewhat efficient, stock prices
react before accounting numbers to events affecting a firm’s performance.
Consequently, Black (1993) is not surprised by the result that firms with high
ratios of book-to-market equity show poor subsequent accounting performance.
Black does not believe there is evidence that book-to-market equity is a priced
risk factor at all.
Other criticisms of the Fama and French’s (1992) study similarly claim
that the results presented are inaccurate. For example, Kothari, Shanken, and
Sloan (1995) argue that the validity of their findings are highly dependent upon
interpretation of their statistical tests. Specifically, Kothari, Shanken, and Sloan
(1995) claim that Fama and French’s (1992) estimates for the coefficient of beta
have high standard errors, and imply that a wide range of economically plausi-
ble risk premiums cannot be statistically rejected. Amihud, Christensen, and
Mendelson (1992) also support the view that the data used by Fama and French
(1992) is too noisy to invalidate CAPM.  The authors show that when a more
efficient statistical method is used, the relation between average return and beta
is positive and significant, as implied by CAPM. Finally, when Breen and
Korajczyk (1993) re-tested the sample used by Fama and French (1992), they
found that the effect of the book-to-market equity ratio was much weaker than
reported. 
In response to this debate, many researchers have tried to focus on alter-
native asset pricing models. However, Jagannathan and Wang (1993) point out
that it may not be necessary to shift to alternative pricing models since one
main reason for the lack of consistent empirical support for CAPM may be due
to the inappropriateness of the assumptions made to facilitate its empirical
analysis. For example, as previously discussed in Roll’s (1977) critique, CAPM
studies do not often use a portfolio that represents the true market portfolio (an
aggregate portfolio of all assets in the economy), instead using a proxy portfo-
lio such as a stock market index (typically the S&P500). By including a more
precise proxy for the true market portfolio, Jagannathan and Wang (1996) are
able to improve the predictability of CAPM by 26.6% over the predictive abil-
ity of studies using the NYSE or AMEX as a market proxy. Finally, when
Jagannathan and Wang (1996) allow for time-varying betas, they show that
CAPM is able to explain 57% of the cross-sectional variation in average
returns. Thus, Jagannathan and McGrattan (1995) conclude that despite the
ongoing academic debate CAPM still has something to offer.
At present, the debate on the validity of CAPM continues unabated.
Rather than attempting to resolve the debate on the validity of CAPM, the cur-
rent article will show that CAPM, however accurately or inaccurately, does
capture and acknowledge the role of the manager as prescribed by strategic
management theory. In order to appropriately understand and resolve the issue,
Journal of Comparative International Management    9:1
58
we must first establish what it is that managers do in the context of financial
management. Both finance and management disciplines accept that firms,
through their managers’ actions, increase in value by making strategic decisions
that ultimately result in positive net present value projects. From a financial
management perspective, the value enhancing effect of these projects depends
on the cost of capital that is derived from a pricing model (perhaps CAPM).
Thus, our goal is to reexamine the role of the manager through a financial man-
agement lens, to establish that management does matter, and to assert that the
managerial role is priced by CAPM and financial management theory.  In the
context of Chatterjee, Lubatkin, and Schulze (1999), the questions we will
attempt to answer are as follows: In pricing only systematic risk, is CAPM pric-
ing a risk that managers cannot control? If managers follow CAPM’s argument
of systematic risk, are managers doing nothing to add value to the firm? Should
managers focus only on unsystematic or firm-specific risk? In order to present
viable solutions to these questions, we present a basic summary of firm valua-
tion, incorporating the role that managers play in the decision making process.
The questions that we will attempt to answer may shed light on the confusion
regarding managers’ role in systematic risk. 
What follows is an alternative explanation of the CAPM in the context of
managerial actions.  We show that risk can indeed be subdivided into tactical,
strategic, and normative components so that Chatterjee, Lubatkin, and
Schulze’s (1999) suggestion is accepted without debate.  However, a simple
model of returns proves that these components are already captured by beta.
Hence, managers’ actions are priced and are relevant according to financial the-
ory.  
The Origins of CAPM
CAPM was developed by Sharp (1964) as an extension to the work of
Markowitz (1952), who defined a mean-variance portfolio for all securities.
Sharpe (1964) imagined a world in which every investor worked within this
mean-variance framework.  Furthermore, Sharpe (1964) assumed that each
investor shared the same expectations regarding returns, variances, and covari-
ances, and that investors were risk-averse.  These assumptions lead us to an
interesting conclusion: If the inputs to every investor’s decision are the same,
and they are all rational, then they should all hold the same assets.  Since every
asset must be held by someone, it follows that all investors will allocate some
portion of their wealth to this “market portfolio.”  
When CAPM was developed, the idea of a “market portfolio” was prob-
ably more far-reaching than today.  Mutual funds that select securities in pro-
portion to their weight in the overall market are commonplace, and are gener-
ally referred to as “passive investment strategies.”  The “market portfolio” was
then used as a benchmark against which all other securities’ risk was measured.
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It led to decomposition of total risk (variance) into its systematic and unsys-
tematic components, where the unsystematic component could be reduced (or
even eliminated) through diversification.
Even if we accept without reservation the findings of Fama and French
(1992), we cannot argue that managerial actions are not priced.  The objective
of the firm is to maximize shareholder wealth or maximize the market value of
the firm, which is reflected in capital markets.  Reflection of value is manifest-
ed in the price of a firm’s stock, so it is an input to the book-to-market ratio used
in the Fama and French (1992) study.  Where does this value come from?  It is
the action of managers that is being reflected in share price.
Let us consider a firm in the oil refining industry.  A firm-specific risk is
the spot price at which it can sell its product on the market several months from
today.  If firm managers want to eliminate price risk, they can take a short posi-
tion in a futures contract and fix the price at which they sell their end product.
That risk is unsystematic because it is unique to the firm and can be eliminat-
ed.  It will not and should not be priced.  However, if managers decide that there
is an option to expand oil production (called a real option), then that decision
is subject to systematic risk.  That is, there is a portion of that investment deci-
sion that cannot be diversified away.  For example, if the government decides
that all new vehicles should be electric and powered by batteries, a firm with a
newly expanded refinery now is faced with a significant loss in demand for its
product.  This risk is directly related to the action and decisions of managers,
and must be priced.
In this paper we examine a steady state firm with constant earnings (i.e.
no growth) that makes a proactive managerial decision to add to its earnings.
Since the returns generated by the decision are subject to systematic risk, man-
agerial actions are not irrelevant.  In fact, they are a priced risk factor in CAPM,
or any other multi-factor model.
Summary of Firm Valuation
Consider a firm with no growth (where investment, I, is exactly offset by
depreciation, Dep) so that its net income is constant and perpetual. Further,
assume that the firm is void of debt (i.e. there is no financial risk) and no taxes.
To allow for debt and taxes does not add to the intuition emanating from this
discussion - it only complicates the model. The perpetual cash flows from this
firm are referred to as free cash flows, FCF. Consider the following basic
income statement for this firm:
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Revenues 100
- Variable costs - 20
- Fixed costs - 20
- Depreciation - 10
Earnings Before Interest and Taxes 50
- Interest -  0
Earnings Before Taxes 50
- Taxes -  0
Net Income 50
In the absence of interest charges and taxes, the firm generates operating cash
flows of $50. However, one of the costs above is depreciation. Depreciation is
a non-cash expense and only affects the taxable base. It is designed to allow the
firm to write down the value of an asset over time, but does not require any
annual cash disbursement. As such, this item does not in any way affect the
before tax cash flows generated by the firm. In reality, the cash that is available
to shareholders for distribution is not the net income (i.e. earnings before inter-
est and taxes (EBIT) in the case of no interest charges and taxes), but the net
income along with the non-cash items previously deducted. The free cash flow
(FCF) to be distributed to shareholders in the above example is actually 50 +
10 (EBIT + Dep), or 60. If we assume that the firm uses the equivalent of the
depreciation expense in order to invest in new projects, then the free cash flow
gets reduced by the 10 and simply becomes a perpetuity of EBIT. Formally:
FCFt = (Revt – VCt – FCt – Dept ) + Dept – It (1)
Since no growth implies Dept = 1t , at time t, it follows that FCFt = EBITt .
Applying the standard valuation principle that the value of an asset (or firm) is
the present value (PV) of all its future cash flows, the market value of the firm,
V: 
EBIT NI
V = ∑ PV (FCFt) = = (2)Rs Rst = 1
8
where Rs is the required rate of return on equity, S .  Also, since there is no debt,
V = S, and  is the market value of equity. Readers will recognize that this is on
the Modigliani and Miller (1958) propositions in a no-tax world.
The Role of Managers in Firm Valuation
Suppose the firm hires a manager with skill, taking actions that affect
EBIT (i.e. business risk1). For example, the manager decides to invest in an
advertising campaign, the net effect of which is to increase revenues by more
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than what was spent, yielding a positive impact on the firm’s cash flow.
Similarly, an investment in research and development could be made to
enhance production efficiency, or the manager may uncover a tax credit accru-
able to the firm in each period, which enhances free cash flows.  Presumably
each of these managerial actions will be decided upon using the rule that if the
action is in the best interest of the firm’s shareholders and stakeholders, then it
will be undertaken.  Thus, the managerial action becomes something called a
“real option.”  That is, for each action, managers have a decision between tak-
ing action to increase EBITt , or, doing nothing at all. The change () in EBIT
is also assumed to be constant and perpetual. Mathematically, this is represent-
ed as:
MAX [EBIT,0] (3)
Thus, ex-ante, we expect that a manager’s decisions and strategic actions will
only be executed if the manager expects those actions to increase EBIT, other-
wise managers will either do nothing or pursue another course of action. This
is an option available to the decision makers of the firm that has either a zero
or positive value. Moreover, the new value of the firm, V*, can then be written
as: 
where  represents the increment or change associated with taking the mana-
gerial action.  In I0 (4), is the investment necessary to generate additional EBIT.
Note that I0  0. At minimum, the additional investment may be zero (this
would occur in cases where the manager made efficiency improvements with
no capital investment).  
Since real options ex-ante never have negative value, we know that V* 
V. In an ex ante/expectation context, a manager will only undertake an action
if he/she expect it to positively affect the value of the firm. Conversely, it is safe
to assume that ex-ante a manager will never take an option that is likely to have
a negative value in the future. However, unlike “normal” options that trade on
underlying assets, holders of real options are not limited in terms of their down-
(4)
V* = ∑ PV (FCFt + FCFt )
t = 1
8
EBIT EBIT
= + – I0Rs Rs
NI NI
= + – I0Rs Rs
= V + Real Option
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side exposure. If a real option proves to be a poor managerial decision ex-post,
the reason is because of the newly created exposure to systematic risk created
by undertaking the real option in the first place. For example, if an investment
in R&D was made to enhance production efficiency, but a competitor makes a
technological breakthrough that nullifies the use of the firms’ project, then I
will be negative, ex-post.  However, ex-ante the manager thought it would yield
an improvement in cash flow. This leads to Remark #1: 
The objective of a firm is to maximize the value of the firm or max-
imize shareholder wealth.  Since managerial actions have either a
positive or zero value, management is not irrelevant to the firm’s
value, nor will management ever be irrelevant. Similarly, negative
value decisions are not irrelevant.
Risk Premium on a Firms’ Equity as a Result of Managerial
Actions
Thus far we have identified two types of cash flows to a firm; cash flows
from a no growth firm and the addition of cash flows from managerial actions.
Defining the required rate of return on equity for a single period as the return
on equity, we see that:
This implies that the return on equity has two components; the return on equi-
ty from no growth investments, plus the added return from managerial options.
According to the CAPM and the single index model of returns:
In this context, NI is the beta associated with the firms’ initial no growth
investments, and NI is the beta associated with the return from the manageri-
al inputs. Notice that there is a systematic component to managerial inputs.
Further, the linearity of the covariance term assures the result in (6).  This leads
to Remark #2:
Substituting for Rs = RNI + RNI implies that:
Cov (Rs , RM)s = 2M
(5)
NI + NI NI NI
Rs = = + = RNI + RNIS S S
(6)
Cov (RNI + RNI , RM)s = 2M
(6)
Cov (RNI , RM) + Cov (RNI , RM)s = = NI + NI2M
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Managerial activities are not only relevant, they are a “priced” sys-
tematic risk factor in firms’ returns.
Remark #2 requires the assumption that cash flows from the no growth firm and
managerial options are subject to systematic and unsystematic risk factors.
Therefore, when we compute the systematic risk for a firm, we are capturing
both the no growth and managerial effects.
Define the following:
RNI = NI + NI RM + NI (7)
and
RNI = NI + NI + NI (8)
The subscripts are removed for clarity.   Moreover, we could write
Rs = (NI + NI RM + NI ) + (NI + NI RM + NI ) (9)
Rs = (NI + NI ) + (NI + NI ) RM + (NI + NI )
Readers may recognize this as an Ordinary Least Squares (OLS) regression
model. Based on the standard assumptions of the OLS model we know that:
2s = (NI + NI )2 2M + (2NI + 2NI ) (10)
2s is defined as the total variance of the firm’s returns Rs, and it is decomposed
into systematic risk (NI + NI )2 2M and unsystematic risk (2NI + 2NI ).
Notice that the systematic risk component incorporates both the original no-
growth exposure, as well as the managerial input.
Portfolio Theory, Unsystematic Risk, and Managerial Actions
According to modern portfolio theory, holding two or more assets has
two effects; (1) weighted average returns, and (2) less than weighted average
risk (if the correlation of R1 with R2 is less than 1).  Since eliminating unsys-
tematic risk is possible, it is assumed that rational investors will hold at least
two securities with less than perfect correlation. Thus, the portion of total risk
that is eliminated or reduced from total portfolio risk is unsystematic risk
because the unsystematic risk across a set of securities will be reduced by their
less than perfect correlation with each other. Systematic risk stemming from the
no growth firm and managerial actions remains regardless of the degree of
diversification. Thus, managerial actions are not only incorporated into sys-
tematic risk, but there is no way to eliminate their effects.  This leads us to
Remark #3:
It is not possible to eliminate the systematic effects of managerial actions.
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Refinement of the Distinction between Systematic and
Unsystematic Risk
Systematic risk, as CAPM theory implies, pertains solely to exposure to
the market portfolio. All that is not market risk must by definition, be unsys-
tematic or idiosyncratic (firm-specific) risk. Unfortunately, as Chatterjee,
Lubatkin, and Schulze (1999) point out, many practitioners who use CAPM
will use a sub-par index, typically the SandP500 as a proxy for the market port-
folio. Therefore, all inferences based on the imperfect proxy as suggested by
Chatterjee, Lubatkin, and Schulze (1999), may be suspect. However, this does
not imply that CAPM is invalid (see discussion of Roll (1977) above). More
importantly, it does not imply that CAPM does not allow for price managerial
interventions.  It does imply is that the definition of systematic and unsystem-
atic risk needs to be contextualized. Therefore, it is within this context that we
show that pricing systematic risk does consider managerial interventions, and
show that systematic risk is not necessarily confined to movements in relation
to a market portfolio - whether the fictitious market portfolio used for theory
development or the oft used S&P500 as the market proxy. Rather, systematic
risks also stem from exposure to market-wide factors resulting from manageri-
al interventions. 
In this context, unsystematic (or firm-specific) risk is idiosyncratic risk,
or a type of white noise that is random and wholly unpredictable. Thus, the
argument that CAPM makes is quite specific. If the volatility of a firm’s stock
returns contains predictable, market-wide movements as well as unpredictable
components, then the investor need not worry about the latter. If enough stocks
are held in a portfolio, the exposure that an investor may have to the unpre-
dictable components will be reduced, due to their random nature in that they
will cancel each other out. Since it is reasonable to assume that these unique
risks are uncorrelated across firms, the argument that follows is that unsystem-
atic risk can be minimized or diversified away by holding a portfolio of at least
two securities2. 
Alternatively, systematic risk cannot be diversified away or reduced by
investors because market-wide factors affect the entire market and the interre-
lated system that comprises the market. However, in relation to strategic man-
agement theory, this discussion of firm-specific risk should not be mistaken to
imply that managers need not concern themselves with differentiating their
firm. On the contrary, consider the firm that is unknowingly about to be faced
with a strike. The stock will probably decrease in value once the news reaches
the media. This price drop will be solely due to the possible long term effects
of the strike, and will have nothing to do with any market-wide movements at
the time. Given that management does not know that a strike is imminent, a
price drop cannot be foreseen or prevented. However, if management is aware
of a potential uprising, does nothing to prevent it, and investors are also aware,
Baigent, Nemiroff and Porrini
65
then it is no longer an unpredictable, idiosyncratic event. Similarly, the manag-
er that wins a surprise or government contract will see the value of the compa-
ny’s stock rise independent of any market-wide movements at the time. The
manager that continues to win contracts has now taken the surprise out of the
equation and contracts become expected.  The stock will gain in anticipation of
future contracts awarded. Therefore, through tactical, strategic, or normative
actions, the manager can differentiate the firm, but these actions may not
increase the volatility of the firm’s returns. In fact, the risks that Chatterjee,
Lubatkin, and Schulze (1999) suggest to be appropriate for managers are in fact
extensions of the systematic component of volatility, and are accounted for and
priced by CAPM.
CAPM and its Implications for Managers
Theoretical models such as CAPM are useful for corporate managers as
they can provide a practical way for managers to ascertain how investors judge
the risk of potential projects, investment opportunities, and strategic decisions.
Thus, models such as CAPM ought to help managers allocate and use their
firm’s resources more efficiently. Managers ought to make decisions that are in
the best interests of their shareholders and stakeholders, but managers do not
necessarily know what their firm’s owners would like them to do. The stock
market and investors’ bids on prices are a way for managers to get a sense of
what investors like or approve of. Capital budgeting tools have a central role
both in the theory and practice of managerial finance. In theory, managers
ought to maximize the value of their firm and only invest in projects they
expect will have a positive net present value. In practice, executing this theo-
retical implication is not simple as it requires careful estimation and evaluation
of the present value of every project under consideration. 
A key way for managers to evaluate the present value of potential proj-
ects is to uncover the cost of financing the project, also known as the firm’s cost
of capital. The cost of capital is the expected rate of return that investors require
for investing in a certain project or financial instrument, and is directly related
to the risk associated with a particular project or group of projects. CAPM’s
role in strategic financial management is to provide a method of assessing the
riskiness of cash flows from a project, and an estimate of the relationship
between risk and the cost of capital. According to CAPM, a project’s required
rate of return can be formulated as a linear function of the project’s beta. Thus,
CAPM can help managers evaluate the acceptability of a project by providing
a benchmark against which to compare the project’s internal rate of return. 
As Jagannathan and McGrattan (1995) point out, if CAPM captures
investors’ behavior adequately, then historical data should reveal a positive lin-
ear relationship between the average return on financial assets and their betas.
As well, no other measure of risk should be able to explain differences in aver-
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age returns across financial assets that are not explained by CAPM betas.
Jagannathan and McGrattan (1995) conclude that empirical studies of CAPM
have supported the model on both of the preceding points, thus making CAPM
an appropriate theoretical model by which managers can make efficient and
effective strategic decisions.
Concluding Remarks
In summary, we have shown that CAPM does indeed reflect the activities
of managers. Managerial actions, however tactical, strategic, or normative in
nature, do impact on risk premiums and are priced by CAPM, even though the
actions are executed on a firm-specific basis. Managers’ decisions and actions
can protect firms from environment and market forces in ways that are valuable
to, and inimitable, by investors. Similarly, managers’ decisions and actions can
also improve earnings streams, free cash flow, net income, and other financial
benchmarks that are indicators of performance. Finally, managerial actions are
noted and considered by equity markets in their pricing of firms’ stock. Thus,
to imply that financial theory or its models relegate management to the “irrele-
vant” category is what would import risk to a firm. It is important for theoreti-
cians and managers to recognize that equity markets will reward managerial
behavior.  Therefore, strategic management does make a meaningful difference
in firm value, and finance theory recognizes and prices this difference.
In consideration of the debate on the usefulness of CAPM, beta may or
may not be an unreliable proxy of firm risk. One caveat we would like to point
out is that CAPM only captures or measures systematic risk when it captures
the efficient market portfolio. The proxy used for the market portfolio, and the
estimated beta derived from it, may not be perfectly efficient, and thus may not
truly measure a firm’s sensitivity to market-wide factors. A further complica-
tion is that betas are not stable over time.  Thus, any reference that suggests that
beta always captures and perfectly parses systematic and unsystematic risk is
incorrect. However, as Jagannathan and McGrattan (1995) point out, CAPM
does capture investors’ behavior adequately, and explains the differences in
average returns across financial assets better than or as well as any other meas-
ure of risk. Thus, we agree with Chatterjee, Lubatkin, and Schulze (1999) that
researchers should proceed with caution when using any abstract measure of
performance because that they should extract meaning from the theoretical
implications of the measure. However, all theoretical models are abstract rep-
resentations of reality and thus, will have some slight imperfections or devia-
tions from reality. 
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Endnotes
1. We are only examining risk that affects sales, not financing.
2. Unless the two assets’ returns are perfectly correlated.
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